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opposed to a hammer or a tank loaded with gas, which would
be dangerous to life and property if negligently manufactured.
Another consideration is whether the defendant is obtaining the
benefit and protection of the state's laws.7 5 For example, nonresident motorist statutes have been upheld on the ground that
one who enjoys the benefits of the state's highways should be
compelled to answer for his negligent act in operating such a
dangerous instrumentality as an automobile in that state.7 6 The
"balance of convenience" test is another factor to be weighed
carefully. If several plaintiffs have a cause of action against
a non-resident corporation, it may be less inconvenient for the
corporation to defend in a jurisdiction foreign to it than to force
individual plaintiffs to pursue defendant in a jurisdiction where
the corporation is present.7 7 But if, on all of the facts, the
burden placed on the defendant would be disproportionate to the
convenience afforded the plaintiff, defendant should not be subjected
to jurisdiction in the forum state.
Complaint must allege a cause of action arising from the acts
enumerated in section 302.
Lebensfeld v. Tuch 71 was an action by plaintiffs to rescind a
sale of assets and recover them from a non-resident defendant as
constructive trustee thereof. The defendant, Weisz, was personally
served in California pursuant to section 302 (a) (2). He was
charged with receiving assets from defendant Tuch, knowing that
Tuch had defrauded plaintiff of these assets in New York. The
complaint did not allege that Tuch acted as the agent of Weisz.
The court dismissed the action against Weisz on the ground that
"if at the time of service, no cause of action based on an
act specified in CPLR 302 was asserted against Weisz, no
personal jurisdiction of Weisz was obtained."
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The court further stated that since it had no jurisdiction
in the first place, it could not grant leave to amend the complaint
because it was defective when it was made. Here summons and
complaint were served together. The court indicated that it might
have allowed the amendment had the summons been served alone,
because the action would not have been, in effect, contaminated in
such instance by a complaint which did not on its face show
jurisdiction under CPLR 302. That aspect of the court's holding
seems unduly technical. While it is salutary to allege in the
complaint the ground of jurisdiction relied upon under CPLR 302,
776 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 72, at 319.
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there is nothing in the CPLR expressly requiring it. The entire
tenor of the CPLR, on the other hand, is that, in regard to
pleadings, we are today to be influenced more by what the facts
really are than the way in which the pleadings set them down.
Even if, on motion, a complaint is dismissed for failing to
state a cause of action-meaning that the complaint omits entirely
the requisite allegations of the cause of action itself-the court
has power, under CPLR 3211(e), to permit amendment of it,
thereby preserving the action and obviating its commencement
anew. So it should be with jurisdictional allegations, too, especially
where there is no statutory requirement that jurisdictional bases
be alleged in the complaint.
The foregoing conclusions are given strong support by
analogy to federal jurisdictional allegations in pleadings. There,
where allegations to the effect that there is a federal question in
the case or diversity of citizenship are requisite to subject-matter
(not merely to personal) jurisdiction, it is expressly provided by
statute that "defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended
80

The holding of the instant case may also have the tendency
to discourage that which should surely be encouraged: the service
of the summons and complaint together. The plaintiff serving his
summons alone may amend the complaint to allege CPLR 302
jurisdiction if, when later the complaint is served, the allegations
are defective, or are omitted altogether, while the plaintiff who
serves his summons and complaint together-which service is
surely more convenient to the defendant-is penalized by having
his complaint held unamendable to supply or to correct jurisdictional
allegations. It would be more appropriate to permit the amendment
if the facts of jurisdiction are present.
Section 311 - Personal serice upon a corporation.
Section 311 81 abolishes the distinction that existed under the
CPA between foreign and domestic corporations. It also abolishes
the distinction between classes of persons upon whom service can
be made. Under Section 229(3) of the CPA, service could be
effected on, e.g., a cashier or managing agent only if service
could not be made with due diligence upon an officer of the corporation or upon a person designated by law to accept service
of process.
8028 U.S.C. § 1653 (1948).
81 Section 311 provides that personal service shall be made by delivering
the summons upon any domestic or foreign corporation "to an officer, director,
managing or general agent . . . [or] any other agent authorized by ap-

pointment or by law to receive service. ....
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